Thesis - Chapter 03 (What is a Person?)
Todman (Theo)
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Write-up2 (as at 14/02/2026 00:41:46): Thesis - Chapter 03 (What is a Person?)

Chapter Contents
  1. Abstract3
  2. Methodology4
  3. Introduction5
  4. Note Hierarchy6
  5. Main Text7
  6. Concluding Remarks8
  7. Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed9
  8. Works Read10
  9. Further Reading11
  10. References & Reading List

Abstract
  1. This chapter will canvass the various views of what Persons are and consider how important issues in this area are for my main concern of ‘our’ identity.
  2. It will also consider whether it makes sense to say that we are persons.


Research Methodology
  • Follow this Link12 for a generic statement of how I intend to pursue each Chapter.
  • The method is broken down into 16, possibly iterative, stages, some of which have sub-stages.
  • Follow this Link13 for my progress dashboard on these tasks.


Chapter Introduction14
  1. Firstly, we need to consider just what a Person15 is. In particular, is Personhood a Substance concept (assuming a Substance16 rather than Process17 metaphysics) or is it a Property18 of a Substance?
  2. Then we need to consider what Properties qualify an individual to be a Person. Additionally, when does the individual become a person, and having become a person, can that individual later cease to be a person?
  3. The properties usually taken as being essential for persons include several on which I have individual Notes.
    1. A person has a First Person Perspective19, the person’s window on the world, and reflexively on itself.
    2. Persons have Free Will20, at least to the degree that Free Will is possible in the world in which we live.
    3. A Person is an Intelligent21 being (though not all such qualify as Persons).
    4. A person has Language (or at least a Language of Thought22).
    5. Finally, there are – for human persons at any rate (and presumably for the Persons supposedly forming the Holy Trinity) – Social23 aspects to personhood.
  4. We need to distinguish Persons from their Personalities24. When people say that so-and-so is no longer the same person, they usually mean that the individual has had a radical change of personality.
  5. Having decided what a Person is, we need to decide what kind of being is a Person. We need to canvass the usual list of candidates other than ourselves – Human Persons25 – which are covered in my Note on Non-Human Persons26.
  6. It is often assumed that being a Person is an all or nothing affair, with persons having infinite moral value, and non-Persons having negligible value: is – or should – this be so? Can there be Degrees of Personhood27? My Note on Wantons28 is also relevant in this context.
  7. Given the variety of potential Persons, we might doubt whether there are persistence criteria for Persons as such. This gives rise to the choice between Reductionists29, who hold that the persistence of Persons is governed by those of the sort of entities that constitute them, and holders of the Simple View30, which denies this.
  8. We also need to ask how well integrated Persons are, as discussed in my Note on The Unity of the Person31. How do we Count Persons32? Is there a 1-1 match with the entities that constitute them? Can there be such entities as Personites33?
  9. Finally, do the various theories of Personhood Take Persons Seriously34, or at least sufficiently so?


Note Hierarchy
  1. Qualities of Personhood
    1. Person35
    2. First-Person Perspective36. Excluded37
    3. Free Will38
    4. Intelligence39
    5. Language of Thought40
    6. Social41
  2. Personality42
  3. Who is a Person?
    1. Human Persons43
    2. Non-Human Persons44
    3. Degrees of Personhood45
    4. Wantons46
  4. The Persistence of Persons
    1. Reductionism47
    2. The Simple View48
  5. Unity of the Person49
    1. Counting Persons50
    2. Personites51
  6. Taking Persons Seriously52


Main Text
  1. Introduction
    1. The main philosophical argument about Persons is whether PERSON is a substance53-concept in its own right, or whether it is parasitic on other substance-concept(s).
    2. My own view is that Human Persons are phase sortals54 of human animals, but other philosophers have more robust views of persons and think of them as substances in their own right.
    3. Famously, Locke55 held this view, and Lynne Rudder Baker56 was a contemporary exponent – her view being that human persons are constituted by57, but are not identical to, human animals58.
    4. In this thesis, I’m only concerned with human persons, and – like most philosophers – allow that there can be non-human persons59 (God, gods, angels, aliens, robots, Great Apes, etc.)
    5. All this is predicated on deciding just what PERSONS are, which in turn depends somewhat on whether we take PERSON to be a natural kind60 concept, or something that is socially constructed and so not something the correct definition of which we can discover.
    6. I defer discussion of the important topic of the First-Person Perspective61 until Chapter 762.
  2. Qualities of Personhood
    1. Person63
      1. We must first consider whether the debate on personal identity has been hijacked by a term (whose meaning has changed over time) that can now be dispensed with. Wiggins claims (in "Wiggins (David) - The Person as Object of Science, as Subject of Experience, and as Locus of Value", I think) that the Greeks had no term for “person”. Have we always secretly been talking about human animal identity (probably referring to human beings64 rather than human animals) when we thought we were talking about something separate, namely persons? See "Ferner (Adam) - Metaphysics and biology: a critique of David Wiggins’ account of personal identity" for a detailed exegesis of Wiggins’s views.
      2. See "Trendelenberg (Adolf) - A Contribution to the History of the Word Person" for the usage of the term ‘person’ prior to the 20th century.
      3. For a slightly less ancient treatment, see also:-
        → "Mauss (Marcel) - A Category of the Human Mind: the Notion of Person; the Notion of Self"
        → "Allen (N.J.) - The Category of the Person: a Reading of Mauss’s Last Essay"
        → "Collins (Steven) - Categories, Concepts or Predicaments? Remarks on Mauss’s use of Philosophical Terminology"
      4. For a more contemporary historical discussion, see "Rorty (Amélie Oksenberg) - Persons and Personae".
      5. We need to start with some conceptual65 analysis, though this may lead to somewhat arbitrary (ie. merely semantic66 or culture-relative) conclusions if PERSON isn’t a natural kind67 concept.
      6. I accept Locke68’s conceptual distinction between Human Beings69 (“Men”), Persons and Substances70. I accept Locke’s assertion that the rational parrot would be a person, but not a man – the latter essentially involving particular physical characteristics, the former specific mental characteristics.
      7. Can any purely mentalistic definition of the concept PERSON, such as Locke’s definition of a person as
          “a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places” ("Locke (John) - Of Identity and Diversity" - Essay II.27.2)
        be correct? I suspect not, because of the corporeal aspects we take as being essential to our self-image.
      8. But, when we think of ourselves in this corporeal way, is this qua ANIMAL or qua PERSON. But then, this “qua-ing” can lead to relative identity71, and shows how difficult it is to maintain the strict logic of identity72 in these discussions.
      9. Some further thoughts:-
        • We must not ignore potential differences between the Person, the Self73 and the Individual74.
        • I doubt the truth of the contention that one’s Self is the sum of one’s projects, one’s individual “identity75”.
        • We must also note the potential for degrees of personhood76.
        • Are persons essentially sentient? Or rational? And is rationality, like the mental generally, overstated by philosophers whose favourite habitat it is?
        • What about temporal gaps77 in sentience & rationality in the life of an individual – does the person pop in and out of existence?
        • What about legal persons: not companies, but the comatose, who still have estates (but then so do the deceased78)?
        • How important is “person”, as against “sentient being79” in my research concerns? The Cartesians denied sentience to animals80 and until recently there has been a down-playing of the capacities of animals, particularly their emotional capacities. Consequently, the persistence criteria81 for sentient non-humans may not have been given the focus they ought. I suspect that many of the thought experiments82 work just as well if we drop some of the more onerous requirements of personhood in such contexts. Some of the thought experiments play on the thought of “being tortured tomorrow83”. While animals may not have the concept TOMORROW, I presume the higher animals have some capacity for anticipating future goods or ills about to befall them – that’s how dog-training works84. I wonder whether my research concerns should be about all beings that care about the future, whether or not they have a clear concept of it as their future.
      10. To aid in investigating just what persons are I will start with Dennett’s six criteria of personhood (see "Dennett (Daniel) - Conditions of Personhood", on which I have written an essay85):-
        1. Rationality,
        2. Intentionality – “predicated of”
        3. Intentionality – “adopted towards”
        4. Reciprocation of the personal stance,
        5. Verbal communication and
        6. Consciousness
    2. Free Will86
      1. Free-will may prove essential to our concept of a Person87, as is alleged in "Frankfurt (Harry) - Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person".
      2. This idea stems initially from Locke’s view that personhood is a forensic property88 of the individual that allows for praise or blame. Without free will, praise or blame is said to be out of place.
      3. Dennett’s views in
        → "Dennett (Daniel) - Freedom Evolves" and
        → "Dennett (Daniel) - Elbow Room - The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting"
        will be of interest, following on from
        → "Dennett (Daniel) - Conditions of Personhood".
      4. See also the Aeon discussion in "Dennett (Daniel) & Caruso (Gregg D.) - Just deserts".
      5. Gregg D. Caruso has written extensively in this area claiming – contra Dennett – that none of us has free will because all we do is down to luck: either constitutive luck – from our genes and initial family situation – or present luck – from our environment. Consequently, Caruso claims that – rather than blame – criminals need therapy89.
      6. Free will also features in discussions of backward Time Travel90.
      7. I’ve covered the topic of future contingents in my essay on Aristotle’s Sea Battle91. I’ve not repeated the associated literature here.
    3. Intelligence92
      1. Intelligence is a very wide-ranging term, and there’s a tendency to focus on what are really fairly minor differences in human aptitudes; namely, in the discussion of IQ.
      2. The intention of this Note is to consider intelligence as a pre-requisite for personhood93.
      3. Clearly, many non-persons (including the higher non-human animals) are intelligent to some degree or other, so is there a qualifying level – or type – of intelligence needed for personhood?
      4. Could intelligence tie in with the possibility of degrees of personhood94? This would seem to be the case if the Great Apes and other appropriate higher mammals are included in the category of Non-human Persons95.
      5. Also, there’s the issue of Superintelligence – that of (future, putative) machines that exceed humans in intelligence, whatever that means. This is “The Singularity”. Will they also be Non-human Persons96, of a superior kind? That is, is intelligence sufficient for this accolade of personhood? I assume not and that sentience is needed as well as sapience.
    4. Language of Thought97
      1. According to "Dennett (Daniel) - Conditions of Personhood", Linguistic competence is one of the six essential features of personhood. It seems there are two reasons for this:-
        1. One is communication, as the formation of and participation in societies are essential to the flourishing of persons98.
        2. The other is that the sort of self-reflection needed for personhood allegedly requires language.
      2. In response:-
        1. I believe there can be non-verbal communication between higher animals – especially those that are candidates for personhood (maybe of reduced degree99) – indeed, this must be the case for social beings.
        2. Also, cogitation doesn’t require the ability to verbalise if there’s such a thing as a language of Thought. Our conscious thoughts do seem to involve internalised spoken language, but maybe our unconscious ones don’t.
      3. So, the relevance of Jerry Fodor’s Language of Thought (LOT) hypothesis within the sphere of personal identity arises because of the alleged essentiality of language for personhood. As such, all non-human animals100 would be ruled out because even if certain Great Apes can be taught sign-language, this is not natural to them in the way language is to human beings.
      4. It is also often alleged (eg. by Donald Davidson) that animals cannot even think in the absence of language, because thinking requires concepts101, and concepts are only expressed in language.
      5. These (to me) unwanted conclusions might disappear if all animals whose minds appear to have intensional states should have a language of thought.
      6. I don’t know whether Fodor cares about animals in this context, or whether his theory was designed strictly with human beings102 in mind.
      7. I like the idea that a LOT – which initially only helps an individual – might explain how spoken language arose amongst human beings – given that a spoken language requires a pair of speakers before it becomes useful (even if grunts and other vocalisations don’t). If a language of thought spilled out into vocalisation, even though individual vocalisations might be initially mutually-unintelligible, a conventional speech (constrained only by universal grammar) might naturally arise with the co-operative behaviour germane to social animals.
      8. See "Rescorla (Michael) - The Language of Thought Hypothesis" for an overview.
    5. Social103
      1. It seems that the social aspects of personhood are deemed to be the most important – indeed the defining – aspects of what it is to be a person by some contemporary philosophers.
      2. I have in mind Anne Sophie Meincke in this regard, but no doubt there are others.
      3. I have my doubts as it seems to encourage the widening of the net of personhood to include social animals – including ants and bees – that are clearly not persons unless personhood loses any appropriate sense of being a forensic property104, or else the moral community is expanded to a degree that makes its current norms unworkable.
      4. Such suggestions need to be compared with other assessments of what it is to be a person105, as in my discussion of Daniel Dennett – Conditions of Personhood106. The social aspect is assumed rather than explicitly mentioned.
      5. There are also issues about our “identities” – in the sense of Narrative Identities107 or our sexual identities – being defined or constrained by the society in which we live.
  3. Personality108
    1. “She’s not the same person”, means she’s undergone a change of personality. It does not mean that she’s a numerically-different individual. Such is agreed by all but the most extreme (or maybe most consistent) adherents of the psychological view109 of personal identity.
    2. What are personalities? Are personalities a loose collection of properties and predispositions? Do personalities have persistence conditions, so that saying that someone has or has not changed their personality even makes sense?
    3. Consider an analogy with weight. It makes sense to ask whether individual x has the same weight at time t1 as at t2. That makes sense because weight is a well-defined property. Of course, for “weight” to be a useful practical concept in this context, there is a tolerance; differences of a few grams don’t count, though those of a few kilograms do. However, “personality” is a much less well-defined concept110, and similar111 ones may count as the same.
    4. We do allow for our personalities to “evolve” as we mature, so – presumably – we think of them as having persistence conditions of some sort. Too radical a change is shocking to us, leading to the opening quote above.
    5. I have a separate discussion later on of Multiple Personality Disorder112, some interpretations of which claim that multiple persons inhabit the same human being (as is reflected by the new term “Dissociative Identity Disorder”, though some don’t treat it as a “disorder” at all) while others – more traditionally – think of it as a fragmented personality.
  4. Who is a Person?
    1. Human Persons113
      1. Human persons are the only persons we have direct knowledge of – in the sense of both knowing that they are (or can be) persons114, and what it is like to be such a person.
      2. It is probably only a matter of semantics whether human beings115 are persons throughout their lives. That is, if the term is only applied to individuals with the relevant properties at the time of application, or whether it applies to ‘once and future’ persons, or to all who belong to the species homo sapiens116.
      3. As Person117 is a forensic property118, this matter of semantics has ethical and legal consequences. I think these questions get very muddled.
      4. There’s a question whether Neanderthals and other extinct hominins ought to be categorised as human or non-human persons119, that is if they can be known to have been persons at all (rather likely in the case of the Neanderthals).
    2. Non-Human Persons120
      1. Amongst philosophers, if not amongst the general populace, it is usually taken for granted that there can be persons who are not human beings121. The usual candidates are:-
        1. Extinct Hominids, where these are not categorised as “human” (see the Note on Homo Sapiens122 for a discussion of Neanderthals; there’s a question whether Neanderthals ought to be categorised as human persons123or non-human persons).
        2. The higher Non-human Animals124, especially the Great Apes,
        3. Aliens,
        4. Angels,
        5. God,
        6. gods,
        7. Androids125 (or appropriately-configured Robots),
        8. Cyborgs126, at least those with silicon127 (or other inorganic) brains128 (those with human brains will, naturally, be human persons129).
        9. Computers130 – or computer programs – or the combination thereof – of appropriate structure and complexity.
      2. See also my discussions of Transhumanism131, and Uploading132 for further consideration of various of the above.
      3. Angels and aliens are discussed in "Wiggins (David) - Reply to Snowdon (Persons and Personal Identity)" and the claim is that insofar as we can conceptualise them, they are animals133. Wiggins also discusses robot-persons134. If, in order to satisfy the conditions of personhood, these end up as molecule-by-molecule clones135 of animals, these are animals also. So – with the possible exception of God and gods – Wiggins doesn’t think there are counter-examples to the supposition that all persons are animals.
      4. The question is whether these candidates can be persons, and what – if they can – this fact tells us about what persons are.
    3. Degrees of Personhood136
      1. That personhood may come in degrees – rather than being “all or nothing” – is rather a dangerous thought, at least if applied to human persons137.
      2. However, if we are inclined to extend the boundaries of personhood to include some higher non-human animals138 (or – in the future – artificial intelligences139) – but don’t want them to be on a par with human beings, for instance in moral accountability – we might have to allow the thought “person – 2nd class”, or something like that.
      3. It seems clear that the qualities that qualify an individual to be a person140, come in degrees.
      4. The key point at issue is probably whether personhood is an honorific (a property of substances) rather than a substance141-term itself. If it is not a substance-term, as I believe it is not, then we have the option to provide – say – legal protection to the underlying substance – say human animal142 or human being143, and then denying the epithet “person” to some human beings need not have the genocidal overtones that are usually suspected whenever such a thought is expressed. But, it still might be better to avoid refusing the term altogether.
      5. So, maybe some persons are “more” persons than others and persons do indeed come in degrees. But maybe they are just better persons according to some criteria – whether ethical or metaphysical – and these criteria need to be sharply distinguished.
      6. For instance Frankfurt – in "Frankfurt (Harry) - Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person" – claimed that wantons144 are not persons, but maybe we should say that (from an ethical perspective) they are poor exemplars of the concept PERSON.
      7. We can think of an analogy with animals. Some animals (eg. human beings – or, lest we be considered a special case - chimpanzees) are, according to many evaluative criteria, superior to other animals (worms). Yet all are animals. Now ethically and practically, some animals deserve greater consideration than others – it would appear that chimpanzees have a greater capacity for suffering than worms, for instance. So too, presumably, do exemplars of the same species, though not to the same degree except in severely pathological cases.
      8. The issue is thus highlighted by the possibility that some of the higher mammals are persons, nearly persons, or persons of reduced degree. If all persons are just persons, period, and all persons have to be treated equally (if that is our ethical outlook), then we might be stuck with duties that seem counter-intuitive (to some, at least). Alternatively, an “all or nothing” stance may be used by us to avoid giving certain sentient beings the care they deserve.
    4. Wantons145
      1. “Wanton” is a term of art introduced in "Frankfurt (Harry) - Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person", of which I’ve written a Review146.
      2. According to Frankfurt, wantons are human beings147 who aren’t moral persons, because they lack second order desires (they don’t want to want to do x or be morally like y).
      3. Most human beings (the persons148) care what their moral likes and dislikes are, and want to reform or improve their moral sensibilities and characters. They care about their moral state. Wantons don’t; they are happy as they are (and not because they are moral saints).
      4. While the term “wanton” is a useful one, I think excluding wantons from falling under the concept149 “person150” is making that concept too narrow. Frankfurt may have hijacked the term wanton, but he has left no important semantic gap in so doing (he has probably done no more than perform a service by clarifying the term).
      5. However, in restricting the term “person” to non-wantons, he is (I would claim) invoking a semantic shift that would then require a new term, PERSON-Minus, to cover those wanton human beings who enjoy the non-moral properties that Frankfurt-persons enjoy. Maybe they would be persons of reduced degree151?
  5. The Persistence of Persons
    1. Reductionism152
      1. Reductionism in the field of Personal Identity has much the same meaning as elsewhere in philosophy, namely:-
        1. Explanatory Reduction: explaining PID in terms of simpler concepts153, or
        2. Ontological Reduction: saying that persons154 are “really” other things, or are made up of or constituted by155 other things.
      2. This contrasts with the Simple View156, which denies either of these options.
      3. Currently, my thoughts on the matter are derived from:-
        1. "Garrett (Brian) - Personal Identity and Reductionism", and
        2. "Garrett (Brian) - Animalism and Reductionism",
          but I will add to the topic further over time.
      4. From my perspective, the interesting element is Garrett’s consideration of Phase Sortals157.
      5. "Cassam (Quassim) - Parfit on Persons" claims that Animalism158 is a non-reductionist account of PID – indeed, the best one!
      6. Derek Parfit is credited with introducing the term “Reductionism” into the field of Personal Identity from elsewhere in philosophy.
    2. The Simple View159
      1. Most theories of personal identity assume that PI is reducible to something else, so is to be analysed in terms of physical or psychological continuities, or to be explained by our being human animals.
      2. The simple view is just the contrary of the above:-
        1. "Olson (Eric) - In Search of the Simple View" denies that the distinction is coherent.
        2. "Gasser (Georg) & Stefan (Matthias), Eds. - Personal Identity: Complex or Simple?" (in which the above paper appears) discusses various arguments pro and con.
        3. See "Coliva (Annalisa) - Review of Gasser & Stefan, Eds. - Personal Identity: Complex or Simple?" for a review of the above.
        4. It’s probably best to start with "Gasser (Georg) & Stefan (Matthias) - Personal Identity: Complex or Simple? Introduction".
      3. It seems that Baker’s Constitution View160 is a form of the Simple View: see "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Personal Identity: A Not-So-Simple Simple View".
  6. Unity of the Person161
    1. There’s a presumption in the philosophy of personal identity that the person162 is a single well-defined individual. This is probably a hang-over from the days of Cartesian163 Dualism164 or when it was assumed that each of us had an indivisible Soul165. Nevertheless, this, depending on what the referent of person166 is supposed to be, can seem (and maybe is) quite sensible.
    2. However this unity has been disputed – for instance in the different interpretations of Multiple Personality Disorder (PMD167):-
      1. Supporters of the Psychological View168 argue that cases of MPD169 show that there can be multiple persons sharing the same body. This assumes that a person is some sort of well-integrated personality, no part of which is shut off from the rest (as is allegedly – though doubtfully – the case in MPD170). So – on this view – each of the multiple personalities171 is deemed to be a separate person172, and so (it is said) the person cannot be identical to the human being173 that houses it. Of course, any idea of integration ought to have gone out when Freud came in.
      2. However, animalists174 (and others) would argue that this is all a mis-description, and that all we have is a fragmented self175 (as is implied – maybe – in the current terminology – Dissociative Identity Disorder), or some other cognitive disorder176 within a single human animal177 (to which the title “person” is properly addressed, they say, though only in the sense of a phase sortal178).
    3. Lynne Rudder Baker179 – a proponent of the Constitution View180 – (CV) claims (fairly plausibly) that each of us181 is individuated by a First Person Perspective182 (FPP). According to the CV, we – the persons – are separate from our bodies, but form a unity with them. In the case of your fission183, she thinks (implausibly) that there would be a fact of the matter (somehow), as to which of the two fission products received your FPP184. You would just know. Well, you wouldn’t, unless there was continuity of consciousness185 throughout the process of fission, as I argue under the topic of the Reduplication Objections186.
    4. This intuition that the person is a unity is referred to as the Unity Reaction in "Blackburn (Simon) - Has Kant Refuted Parfit?" and some other works.
    5. I suppose there could be some discussion of the doctrine of Divine Unity within a Trinitarian framework, but I’ll treat this as out of scope, and probably incoherent.
    1. Counting Persons187
      1. What are the adverse consequences of David Lewis’s perdurantist188 approach to fission189 in personal identity?
      2. According to this theory, there were always coincident stages of the two space-time worms prior to fission. So, there were two persons there all along; yet we counted only one, being ignorant of190 the future fission.
      3. What are the consequences of miscounting? No doubt this depends on what function (or more likely functions) our concept191 of PERSON192 performs.
      4. We might ask whether it is just persons who are miscounted, or are human beings193 also miscounted? This will obviously depend on the TE194, which would need spelling out.
      5. Take the case of a half-brain195 transplant196. In this TE, a person’s psychology is supposed to be duplicated197 within two idempotent half-brains, one of which stays in the donor’s head, the other being transplanted into the empty skull of a recipient. In this TE, the psychological view198 of personal identity is assumed. We start off with one locus of psychology, and end up with two. This is the standard problem of fission199 – which successor is identical to the original person? We seem to want both to be, but – in the absence of perdurantism200 – the logic of identity201 forbids it. Perdurantism202 helps us out, at the cost of there being more pre-fission persons than we thought.
      6. What about other fall-out? Are the earlier stages of the “recipient” patient – viewed as an animal – spatially distributed – so is such a distributed203 thing a human being at all?
      7. What is the core of humanness – is this always the brain204, so that the human goes along with the half-brain, and the body205 is just like any other transplant, only bigger?
      8. Problems with counting persons also allegedly arises in the context of:-
        → Multiple Personality Disorder206, and
        → Commissurotomy207
        While the latter is a precursor for the half-brain transplant described above, both are at least actual situations that are less open to the charge of under-description often alleged against TEs.
      9. Finally, for now at least, and maybe most importantly – the issue of counting arises in Eric Olson’s Thinking Animal Argument208, and the various conundrums involving (partly) coincident objects209.
    2. Personites210
      1. PERSONITE is a term of art related to that of Person211 recently coined by Mark Johnston212, though Eric Olson much earlier used the term “subperson” for the same concept. Olson also considers “cross-persons” – which are aggregates of temporal parts of different persons. He is simply adding the temporal dimension to the plenary ontology that allows any gerrymandered aggregate – my nose and the Eifel Tower – to be a “thing”.
      2. Anyway, a Personite is a temporal part of a person. If personites exist, and have moral status, then ethical problems arise as – for example – one personite gets the punishment for the misdeeds of another.
      3. Olson – without saying so explicitly – thinks that there are the same sort of problems arising for personites as arise for the Constitution View213. He also distinguishes Linguistic from Moral persons; the former are the references of personal pronouns according to our linguistic conventions, the latter are the appropriate recipients of our moral concerns. He can’t see how we can guarantee these coincide if we allow the existence of personites.
      4. Personites are also a consequence of Parfit214’s Relation R as a criterion for what matters in persistence, given that its application is vague.
      5. I doubt there are any more problems with personites than with appear in the problems:-
        → Dion and Theon215,
        → Tibbles the Cat216,
        → The Problem of the Many217,
        and the like. It just adds a temporal dimension, though this is already present in "Lewis (David) - Survival and Identity", as Johnston acknowledges.
  7. Taking Persons Seriously218
    1. Lynne Rudder Baker219 accused animalists220 of “not taking persons seriously”. But, how seriously should they be taken (in metaphysics)?
    2. Probably what really matters ontologically221 is the possession of a conscious222 perspective (though not necessarily – I would claim – a self-conscious223 or first-person224 perspective). This is what we must take seriously.
    3. Baker argued that there exists an ontological difference at this stage too … but, why is the first-person perspective225 as she defines it so very important – all that worrying about death?
    4. Buddhists226 are trying to lose this sense of self227. Do all cultures have this sense?
    5. See228 "Wong (David) - Relativism" for the traditional Chinese view, which takes the community more seriously than the individual.
    6. Whether we ought to take moral or rational beings extra seriously is the point at issue. Clearly we should. But this doesn’t necessarily have any ontological229 implications (as Baker claims). Certain animals – including (most) humans – just have an extra property that demands they be given extra moral consideration.


Concluding Remarks
  1. In our next Chapter230, now that we have determined what we are – and what persons are – we consider various metaphysical issues that bear on the arguments for and against the various positions on Personal Identity.
  2. This is work in progress231.


Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed232
  1. This section attempts to derive the readings lists automatically from those of the underlying Notes, but removing duplicated references. The list is divided into:-


Works on this topic that I’ve actually read235, include the following:-
  1. Qualities of Personhood
    1. Person236
    2. Free Will251
    3. Intelligence260
    4. Language of Thought264
    5. Social267
  2. Personality269
  3. Who is a Person?
    1. Human Persons271
    2. Non-Human Persons273
    3. Degrees of Personhood275
    4. Wantons277
  4. The Persistence of Persons
    1. Reductionism283
    2. The Simple View286
  5. Unity of the Person
    1. Unity of the Person288
    2. Counting Persons292
    3. Personites293
  6. Taking Persons Seriously294

A further reading list might start with:-
  1. Qualities of Personhood
    1. Person302
    2. Free Will312
    3. Intelligence313
    4. Language of Thought315
    5. Social316
  2. Personality317
  3. Who is a Person?
    1. Human Persons318
    2. Non-Human Persons319
    3. Degrees of Personhood321
    4. Wantons322
  4. The Persistence of Persons
    1. Reductionism323
    2. The Simple View324
  5. Unity of the Person
    1. Unity of the Person326
    2. Counting Persons330
    3. Personites331
  6. Taking Persons Seriously332


In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 2:
  • This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (14/02/2026 00:41:46).
  • Link to Latest Write-Up Note.
Footnote 14:
  • The hyperlinks in this Introduction – as in the other Chapter Introductions – are intended to help motivate the various Notes used in the construction of the Chapter.
  • So, a link appears once and once only per Note in the Note Hierarchy below and appears – as far as possible – in the order of the Hierarchy, even if this is not its first mention.
  • Links to other Notes are omitted in the Chapter Introduction but appear passim in the Main Text.
  • To enable the same text to be used in my Thesis Write-up as in this document, Chapter links are to the former.
Footnote 37:
  • This Note will be excluded from the Reading List for this Chapter.
  • It is included in the Reading List for Chapter 7.
Footnote 84:
  1. This is – of course – a tricky area, given the long behaviorist tradition of training pigeons.
Footnote 89:
  1. There is no doubt some truth in this.
  2. However, not all wrong-doers had bad starts in life, and I suspect that many who did would prefer to take the punishment if the alternative is the real loss of freedom in a rehabilitation programme.
  3. Compare the Soviet view that dissidents are insane and need curing.
Footnote 91:
  1. See "Todman (Theo) - Aristotle - Sea Battle".
Footnote 140:
  1. See in Dennett, and also my main Note on Persons.
Footnote 146:
  1. See "Todman (Theo) - Review - Frankfurt - Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person".
Footnote 190:
  1. No doubt if this fanciful event could be planned or anticipated we would count differently.
Footnote 212:
  1. Mark Johnston: see:-
    → "Johnston (Mark) - Personites, Maximality and Ontological Trash", and
    → "Johnston (Mark) - The Personite Problem: Should Practical Reason Be Tabled?".
  2. I need to chase up the references in Olson.
Footnote 228:
  1. For my commentary on this, see "Todman (Theo) - Review - Wong - Relativism".
Footnote 232:
  • See the section on Research Methodology for what is to be done with these.
Footnote 245:
  • Read this as an example from the Animal Liberation movement.
Footnote 250:
  • Restrict a close reading to Part 3 (Personal Identity).
Footnote 263:
  • I’ve read this book, but it’s insufficiently philosophical for its arguments – such as they are – to be worth considering as a priority.
Footnote 266: Footnote 270:
  • This, and the follow-up lecture, are interesting for equating the Psychological View of personal identity with a so-called “personality view”, which makes it sound rather silly.
Footnote 278:
  • Baker doesn’t actually mention wantons, but might have!
  • The same goes for the paper by Snowdon.
Footnote 291:
  • Lecture VIII: The Divided Self, and the Process of Its Unification
Footnote 303:
  • Somewhat elementary, but worth (re-)reading quickly
Footnote 304:
  • This paper may be important, but may be too long (and difficult) for a first pass through the literature.
Footnotes 306, 314, 320:
  • This is very elementary, but short and maybe entertaining.
Footnote 307:
  • This is rather introductory to Parfit’s ideas, so read it quickly for that purpose.
Footnote 308:
  • May be useful both as a take on Strawson, and for Plantinga’s own views.
Footnote 309:
  • Stanley got into a debate with Jen Hornsby, though not on this topic, so it’ll be interesting to see how he argues.
Footnote 310:
  • This is a difficult book with which I expect to have little sympathy, but one that has to be read.
Footnote 311:
  • Most of the relevant Chapters have been separately itemised above.
Footnote 325:
  • This seems to be saying that the concept of identity is simple, not that Personal Identity is irreducible to something else.
Footnote 328: Footnote 329:

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