| Human Being: The Boundaries of the Concept |
|---|
| Becker (Lawrence) |
| Source: Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4.4 (Summer 1975), 334-359 |
| Paper - Abstract |
| Paper Statistics | Books / Papers Citing this Paper | Notes Citing this Paper | Text Colour-Conventions | Disclaimer |
Philosophers Index AbstractI propose here what I take to be decisive, morally neutral definitions of the boundaries of human life - that is, of the distinction between human becomings and human beings, and the distinction between human beings and human has-beens. I give reasons for thinking that, for moral theory, these definitions are preferable to ones framed in terms of "morally relevant" characteristics. I argue, against life-cycle and personhood accounts, that the becoming/being boundary lies at the completion of the metamorphic phase of (biological) generative development; and, against brain-death accounts, that the being/has-been boundary lies at the functional disintegration of the human (biological) organism.
Section Headings
… 3.1 Imprecision
… 3.2 Mutation and Arrested Development
… 3.3 Alternatives to Metamorphic Definition
… 3.4 The Moral Emptiness of the Definition
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
| © Theo Todman, June 2007 - July 2026. | Please address any comments on this page to theo@theotodman.com. | File output: Website Maintenance Dashboard | Return to Top of this Page | Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page | Return to Theo Todman's Home Page |