Dion's Foot
Olson (Eric)
Source: Journal of Philosophy 94, No. 5 (May, 1997), 260-265
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. Michael Burke argues that your "foot-complement" ceases to exist when you lose your foot, for otherwise it would change, impossibly, from a nonperson to a person.
  2. I argue that Burke cannot consistently deny that a foot-complement is a person.
  3. Moreover, if he were right, there could be physically indistinguishable objects, only one of which was a person – in which case Burke's case for rejecting the "standard" solution to the "foot" puzzle collapses.

Philosophers Index Abstract
  1. Analyzes the tale of the foot amputation of a certain man named Dion1.
  2. Proposal of Michael Burke's solution to the problem of undetached parts;
  3. Difficulties of the account;
  4. Burke's use of the principle that no person could be a proper part of another.


Reply to "Burke (Michael) - Tibbles the Cat: A Modern Sophisma".

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