Will I Be a Dead Person?
Carter (William)
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Mar99, Vol. 59 Issue 1, p167, 5p;
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

  1. Eric Olson argues from the fact that we once existed as fetal individuals to the conclusion that the standard view of personal identity is mistaken.
  2. I shall establish that a similar argument focusing upon dead people opposes Olson's favored biological view1 of personal identity.

Author’s Abstract
    Focuses on the argument focusing on dead people which opposes Eric Olson's Biological View2 of personal identity.
    → Rejection of the identity claim that raises the fetal problem;
    → Analysis of the Biological View3 and standard view of personal identity;
    → Eliminativist position of corpses in regard to their biological and psychological activity.

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