Personal Identity Over Time
Baker (Lynne Rudder)
Source: Baker (Lynne) - Persons and Bodies, Chapter 5, pp. 118-146
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Write-up1 (as at 28/09/2022 10:24:58): Baker - Personal Identity Over Time

Introduction
Author’s Abstract2
  1. Discusses the vexing problem of personal identity over time. In virtue of what is a person P1 at t1 the same person as a person P2 at t2? I canvass candidate answers to this question, and show that each fails:
    1. Sameness of person consists in sameness of body,
    2. Sameness of person consists in sameness of living organism (Animalism)4,
    3. Sameness of person consists in sameness of brain,
    4. Sameness of person consists in psychological continuity5,
    5. Sameness of person consists in sameness of immaterial soul.
  2. Then, I discuss my own view: sameness of person consists in sameness of first-person perspective6. Alas, my own view does not provide an informative criterion either. Although I can characterize noncircularly what it is to have a first-person perspective7 at a time, I know of no noncircular characterization of sameness of first-person perspective8 over time. Since nobody has an adequate and informative criterion of personal identity over time, I conclude that there is no adequate and informative criterion of personal identity over time: Sameness of person is not reducible to sameness of anything nonpersonal.
  3. Nevertheless, construing personal identity in terms of sameness of first-person perspective9 has its advantages.
    1. First, it avoids problems besetting the other views (e.g., species chauvinism, the duplication10 problem).
    2. Second, it accords well with our self-understanding: there is a fact of the matter whether some future individual is I, and that fact of the matter does not depend on the nonexistence of someone else.
    3. Finally, the idea of sameness of first-person perspective11 ties what it is to be a person over time with what it is to be a person in the first place.

Sections
  1. Other Views of Personal Identity over Time
  2. The Constitution View12 of Personal Identity over Time
  3. Is Bodily Transfer Possible?
  4. Conclusion


Comments on the above12
  1. Chapter 5 ("Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Personal Identity Over Time") discusses the vexing problem of personal identity over time. In virtue of what is a person P1 at t1 the same person as a person P2 at t2? I canvass candidate answers to this question, and show that each fails:
    1. Sameness of person consists in sameness of body,
    2. Sameness of person consists in sameness of living organism (Animalism),
    3. Sameness of person consists in sameness of brain,
    4. Sameness of person consists in psychological continuity,
    5. Sameness of person consists in sameness of immaterial soul.
    • Well, each of these proposals needs to be taken on its merits, and Baker’s objections reviewed. Then, the best candidate needs to be compared with Baker’s alternative. The pros and cons as understood by Baker can only be considered by detailed consideration14 of her arguments in the book, which are not summarised here.
    • It is interesting, though, that Baker here correctly distinguishes between bodies and organisms. Why then – given that she appreciates the distinction – does she focus on bodies elsewhere in this discussion (and in the title of her book) when her target (Animalism) insists that we are organisms?
    • Note that, by Olson’s lights, she begs the question by insisting that the entity at the t1/t2 termini is in both cases a person.
    • That is, is (as Olson insists and Markosian15 agrees) the question of personal identity distinct from that of our identity?
  2. Then, I discuss my own view: sameness of person consists in sameness of first-person perspective16. Alas, my own view does not provide an informative criterion either. Although I can characterize noncircularly what it is to have a first-person perspective17 at a time, I know of no noncircular characterization of sameness of first-person perspective18 over time. Since nobody has an adequate and informative criterion of personal identity over time, I conclude that there is no adequate and informative criterion of personal identity over time: Sameness of person is not reducible to sameness of anything nonpersonal.
    • I see this as the main weakness in Baker’s position (apart from the ontological rants). She admits that she can provide no informative criterion. She adds “either”. But, surely, at least some of these alternative accounts can provide at least some sort of criterion of identity – though it may run into difficulties with vagueness.
    • So, I might agree that psychological criteria, and immaterial souls, are no better off than Baker’s proposals. But what’s wrong with the physical ones? Brains, bodies or organisms.
    • Bodies are a little bit problematical – because the persistence criteria of live ones seem to differ from those of dead ones, and if considered as mere localised hunks of matter, it doesn’t seem that they persist at all. It may be significant that Baker focuses on bodies as the main alternative to her view – choosing a view that’s obviously distinct, yet not very sound?
    • Lots of philosophers are convinced they have principled reasons for thinking that organisms exist, even when they deny the existence of bodies, or undetached proper parts of organisms – brains, for instance.
    • There is room for debate as to just when an organism becomes so mutilated or adulterated as to no longer exist (as an organism) but to have ceased to be and been replaced by something else. While we might admit that we are not brains, if a brain on life support is all that’s left of one of us, we can argue whether it is still an organism; I would say that it is, but one that is “maximally mutilated”.
    • What does "Wilson (Jack) - Biological Individuality - The identity and Persistence of Living Entities" have to say?
    • I need to read "Olson (Eric) - Review of Jack Wilson's 'Biological Individuality: The Identity and Persistence of Living Entities'" to get Olson’s views.
    • "Wilson (Jack) - Personal Identity Naturalized: Our Bodies, Our Selves" is particularly interesting as a contrast to Baker’s view, though Wilson’s ideas on the persistence conditions of organisms are developed earlier in the book – "Wilson (Jack) - Individuality and Equivocation" might be best.
    • Olson does admit that he has no watertight account of the persistence conditions of animals, but is happy to accommodate19 any suggestions as friendly improvements to his theory of personal identity.
  3. Nevertheless, construing personal identity in terms of sameness of first-person perspective20 has its advantages. First, it avoids problems besetting the other views (e.g., species chauvinism, the duplication21 problem). Second, it accords well with our self-understanding: there is a fact of the matter whether some future individual is I, and that fact of the matter does not depend on the nonexistence of someone else. Finally, the idea of sameness of first-person perspective22 ties what it is to be a person over time with what it is to be a person in the first place.
    • Species Chauvinism: I cannot see what necessary connection the other views have to this stance. However, as a matter of fact, some proponents of the “immaterial soul” view have denied souls to animals; and Wiggins has taken “person” and “human being” as synonyms (Olson points this out somewhere23).
    • Duplication24 Problem: just why is the CV view immune to this – or indeed not more exposed to the problem than some other views? Just what sort of thing is a FPP25 that prevents its duplication26? If there are two qualitatively identical human bodies, won’t the FPPs27 be qualitatively identical. Or, even logically identical, depending on what a FPP28 is? Baker insists (above) that human persons are individuated by their bodies - but their FPPs29 are what really matter. How does she deal with idempotent half-brain transplant TEs? Won’t she have the same problem as brain-theorists? Won’t both halves equally support a FPP30? And which one was me – or was I two all along, or did I bud a twin in the process of creating the idempotency? There may be answers to these questions, but the CV seems no better off than the brain view.
    • Facts of the Matter: crumbs. Without saying a lot more about how FPPs31 are individuated, how can this alleged fact be established? How can it be known? If Baker’s point about reduplication32 is unsound, then first person evidence is insufficient, as it is in any reduplication33 TE. It can seem to you that you are the same person, but you are deceived.
    • “Only x or y” : this is the principle opponents of closest-continuer theories adopt – so Baker’s view is not unique.
    • What it is to be the same x is what it is to be an x in the first place: this, again, isn’t unique to Baker’s view, but is the standard reason why criteria of identity are useful for helping to define what sort a thing falls under.


This text below is my detailed review of "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Personal Identity Over Time", Chapter 5 of "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View". The main text is my interpretation of what Baker says, with my specific comments and objections appearing as footnotes.

0. Introduction
  1. Baker distinguishes two questions about the identity of persons:-
    1. Synchronic: What is it to be a Person? Her answer is – for Persons34 in general – to have a FPP35; and, for non-derivative35 Human Persons37, to be a Person constituted by a Human Organism37.
    2. Diachronic: What is it to be the same person at two different times? Baker claims that all proposed answers to this question are – like her own – ‘unilluminating38’ – or ‘clearly false39’. She is also willing to agree that PID is a primitive notion40. She considers the difficult to be supplying sufficient conditions for sameness of person over time without presupposing sameness of person. So, she thinks all Reductive42 accounts of PID are bound to fail. But – like42 "Noonan (Harold) - Personal Identity" – she thinks that non-reductive accounts can be materialistic.
  2. Baker has a footnote in response to the claim in "Olson (Eric) - Persistence" that philosophers of PID falsely assume43 that what is once a person is always a person. Baker denies begging any questions because it is axiomatic to the CV that anything that is non-derivatively a person is essentially a person.
  3. She has a rather obscure footnote saying she’s not saying anything about person stages45 or temporal parts46.
  4. Baker quotes several authors46 in support of the Simple View48, mostly taken from "Zimmerman (Dean) - Immanent Causation":-

1. Other Views of Personal Identity over Time
  1. Various alternative criteria of identity49 are considered. Baker points out that criteria of identity are metaphysical claims (what it takes for something to be the same) rather than epistemological claims (how we come to know that this is the case).
    1. Sameness of person consists in sameness of body50,
    2. Sameness of person consists in sameness of living organism51 (Animalism52),
    3. Sameness of person consists in sameness of brain53,
    4. Sameness of person consists in psychological continuity54,
    5. Sameness of person consists in sameness of immaterial soul55.
  3. … to be supplied.

2. The Constitution View56 of Personal Identity over Time
  3. … to be supplied.

3. Is Bodily Transfer Possible
  1. Baker finds the traditional TEs57 about bodily transfer – such as (Locke58’s) Prince and the Cobbler ‘utterly convincing58’ when considered from the first-person perspective:-
    1. Now, she imagines (what is presumably) a Reduplication Objection61: suppose lots of other people also look in their mirrors and see the same unfamiliar body, and that these people are psychologically continuous with her. Each of these people think they are Lynne Rudder Baker (LB).
    2. So – as we have seen – one is right (namely LB) and the others are wrong. No-one – including the person who actually is LB – can be sure that they are LB.
    3. (If I am LB), you might be able to convince me that I’m not LB, but you won’t be able to convince me that I’m not me, or that I don’t exist. Even though “LB” and “I” rigidly designate the same person, I might have amnesia so not realise that I am LB even though I have no doubt that I am me.
    4. So, if lots of people woke up thinking they were LB, perhaps no-one could discover who was LB, but I would know with certainty which one was I, and each of the others would know with certainty which one was they. But only one of these – namely LB – would be right in thinking she was me (ie. was LB). Each of the others might think they were LB, but they couldn’t believe that they were “I”.
    5. Since each FPP includes a relation to a body, and each of us has a different body, none of the others can have my FPP.
    6. So, it seems conceivable to me (LB) that I – with my FPP – could wake up in a different body. And no matter how many others are both physically and psychologically indistinguishable from me , none can have my FPP. I would always know which one was I even if – on the one hand – others thought they were LB or – on the other – I did not think I was LB.
  2. So, given what she sees as the ‘intuitive plausibility’ of such TEs, she’d need a lot of convincing before accepting that body transfer is metaphysically impossible62. She’d not be put off my not understanding how it might work.
  3. But she wants to consider a (then) recent (1997) argument by Peter Van Inwagen (PVI, in "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Materialism and the Psychological-continuity Account of Personal Identity") that claims to dislodge all such TEs.
    1. PVI argues that the following combination of philosophical beliefs is inconsistent62:-
      → Materialism
      → Realism about Human Persons and their endurance63 over time
      → The possibility of bodily transfer
    2. Baker notes that PVI’s argument – if successful – would – with the associated assumptions – make body transfer metaphysically impossible. However, it is aimed at those who support the PV65, which Baker says she does not.

  6. … to be supplied.

4. Conclusion
  1. Baker thinks that Descartes66 was right on many things:-
    1. I know with certainty that I exist66.
    2. It is a brute fact that a particular experience is mine, and that a particular experience yesterday was mine, whether I remember it67 or not.
    3. My FPP shows itself in68 my ability to conceive of an experience as mine.
  2. It’s not altogether clear which of these thoughts Baker attributes to Descartes, and which to herself, but I doubt it is important where we draw the line. She continues …
  3. ‘Oddly’ the FPP has been neglected in accounts of PID. Even the memory criterion70 is stated by giving conditions stated in impersonal terms: for x to remember70 doing A, x must be identical to the doer of A.
  4. It is the FPP that makes questions of PID even more intractable than other questions of identity, for example71 of ships or cats.
  5. So, PID is a vexing question. Baker has canvassed the alternatives and found that none is satisfactory in wholly non-personal terms.
  6. The CV provides a – theoretically unsatisfying – account of PID in terms of sameness of FPP. There are three points alleged in its favour.
    1. It avoids problems faced by other accounts – eg. Reduplication72 and Species Chauvinism73.
    2. The CV sits well with our self-understanding that there is a fact of the matter74 whether some future individual is I, and this fact doesn’t depend on the non-existence of another person.
    3. The criterion of sameness of FPP unites75 the synchronic and diachronic questions of PID.
  7. Hence, Baker considers her account superior to its rivals.


In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1:
  • This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (28/09/2022 10:24:58).
  • Link to Latest Write-Up Note.
Footnote 2: Footnote 12: Footnote 35:
  • Human Animals are Persons derivatively – according to Baker – because they constitute – temporarily, at least, Human Persons.
Footnote 37:
  • Baker seems rather sloppy about what constitutes Human Persons: she uses Human Bodies, Human Animals and Human Organisms interchangeably.
Footnote 38:
  • For sameness of FPP or Soul, there just is nothing to say.
Footnote 39:
  • False in what sense? Incoherent or counter-factual? And false as to what? As an account of the persistence of Persons, or of Bodies, Animals, Brains or Psychologies?
Footnote 40: Footnote 42:
  • Most of Noonan’s book is expository and critical of other views. He’s supportive of the Simple View, but I missed his materialism. I will re-read in due course.
  • Baker’s reference is to the First Edition (1989) rather than the Second (2003).
Footnote 43:
  • Olson is correct in this. It is tacitly assumed without argument that persons are essentially so, when this need not be the case if personhood isn’t a substance term.
Footnote 46:
  • Interestingly, none of these appear in my Note on the Simple View, as of July 2022.
  • What Baker actually says is that these authors have held that ‘ … there can be no informative criteria of diachronic personal identity’.
Footnote 58:
  • This is probably just an Intuition, though Baker seems to have an argument for it. Not a good one, but I’ll leave commenting on it – and anything else in this Section – until I’ve analysed the lot!
Footnote 62:
  • This is surprising, as PVI – as far as I know – believes all these three claims.
  • I wonder whether Baker has him right? PVI is arguing against the PV.
Footnote 63:
  • I assume he’s using ‘endurance’ in the technical sense of Endurantism
Footnote 66:
  • I think this is fair enough. Contrary to the Nihilists, it is clearer that I exist than is any philosophy that says I don’t.
  • However, this clarity has nothing to say about what I am.
  • Baker shares Descartes’ intuition that she is a ‘thinking thing’, but Olson doesn’t.
Footnote 67:
  • This seems to take a stance against presentism.
  • Isn’t it the case, for presentism, that if there’s no present evidence for a past event, that event no longer exists?
  • What is Baker’s philosophy of Time?
Footnote 68:
  • We need to watch out for slipperiness in the concept of a FPP.
  • I may know that I ate the sausage. Does a dog not know that he ate the sausage? Does he not then have an FPP?
Footnote 70:
  • This is partly an analysis of what ‘remembering’ means, and as this presupposes identity over time, quasi-memory was introduced.
Footnote 71:
  • The persistence of ships – and other artifacts – is vexing because – since they do not fall under natural kind concepts, there may be no non-conventional fact of the matter.
  • Cats – and other animals – do, however, fall under natural kind concepts, so we might hope to find out all the facts about their persistence conditions, though there will be epistemological doubts introduced by vagueness.
  • Does Baker think that identity questions for human animals are relatively non-vexing?
Footnote 72: Footnote 73:
  • She must be joking! The CV is tweaked so that no non-human animals quality for constituting a person.
  • Also, there’s no species-chauvinism in Animalism.
Footnote 74: Footnote 75:
  • Well, so does Animalism - we are animals, and have the persistence conditions of animals.

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