The Very Idea of Constitution
Baker (Lynne Rudder)
Source: Baker (Lynne) - Persons and Bodies, Chapter 2, pp. 27-58
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Write-up1 (as at 28/09/2022 10:24:58): Baker - The Very Idea of Constitution

Introduction
Author’s Abstract2
  1. Provides a technical account of the idea of constitution. The basic idea of constitution is this: when certain kinds of things are in certain kinds of circumstances, things of new kinds, with new kinds of causal powers, come into existence. For example, when a certain combination of chemicals is in a certain environments, a thing of a new kind—an organism—comes into existence. A world without organisms, even if it contained the “right” combination of chemicals but in the “wrong” environment, would not have the same things in it as a world with organisms. So, constitution makes an ontological difference. It guarantees ontological plurality.
  2. The relationship of constitution is ubiquitous. It is not peculiar to human persons and their bodies. It holds between rivers and aggregates of water molecules, between statues4 and pieces of marble, between genes and groups of DNA molecules, between stop signs and octagonal pieces of metal. If x constitutes y at t, then x and y are spatially coincident at t, but they not identical. If x constitutes y at t, then x and y have different persistence conditions5. Identity is a necessary relation; constitution is contingent. (Indeed, I use the notion of constitution to solve problems that others try to solve by notions of contingent identity6, temporal identity7, relative identity8 and so on. The idea of constitution has an advantage over these other views in that the idea of constitution does not compromise the classical notion of identity in its strict Leibnizian form.) I provide a definition of ‘x constitutes y at t’ in order to show that the idea of constitution-without-identity does not suffer from obvious incoherence.
  3. If x constitutes y at t, then x and y share many of their properties: x weighs 100 lbs. at t if and only if y weighs 100 lbs. at t; x is worth $10,000 at t if and only if y is worth $12,000 at t. Each of these properties has its source in either x or y. If a piece of bronze constitutes a statue9 at t, then what exists at t is a statue-constituted-by-a-piece-of-bronze10, whose weight has its source in its being (constituted by) a piece of bronze, and whose value (usually) has its source in its being a statue11. This observation leads to the notion of ‘having properties derivatively.’ The piece of bronze has its weight nonderivatively; the statue12 has its weight derivatively. The statue13 has its value nonderivatively; the piece of bronze has its weight derivatively. To have a property derivatively is to constitute, or be constituted by, something that has the property independently of its constitution-relations. Only some properties are subject to being had derivatively. All this is spelled out in two definitions. The notion of having a property derivatively explains why if x and y both weigh 100 lbs. at t, and x and y are not identical, it does not follow that there is an object that weighs 200 lbs. where x is at t.
  4. The idea of constitution is decidedly nonreductive. As long as x constitutes y, x has no independent existence. If x continues to exist after the demise of y, then x comes into its own, existing independently. But during the period that x constitutes y, “what the thing really is” — y, constituted by x — is determined by the identity of y. So, what is in front of you when you go to a museum is a statue14 (constituted, perhaps, by a piece of bronze). What the thing most fundamentally is a statue15; but it is constituted by a piece of bronze.
Sections
  1. A Description of Constitution
  2. The Road to Essentialism
  3. A Definition of ‘Constitution’
  4. Having Properties Derivatively
  5. Conclusion


Comments on the above15
  1. Chapter 2 ("Baker (Lynne Rudder) - The Very Idea of Constitution") provides a technical account of the idea of constitution. The basic idea of constitution is this: when certain kinds of things are in certain kinds of circumstances, things of new kinds, with new kinds of causal powers, come into existence. For example, when a certain combination of chemicals is in a certain environments, a thing of a new kind – an organism – comes into existence. A world without organisms, even if it contained the “right” combination of chemicals but in the “wrong” environment, would not have the same things in it as a world with organisms. So, constitution makes an ontological difference. It guarantees ontological plurality.
    • So – according to Baker – an organism is “constituted by” its chemicals? It’s true that an organism is not identical to its chemicals – because it can lose or gain matter. So, while it is constituted by chemicals, it is not constituted by any bunch of chemicals in particular (though it is constituted by certain types of chemicals).
    • While “new causal powers” is important to constitution, it’s a thorny issue. I suspect that there are different forms of causation that are confused. For instance:-
    • What causal powers do (human) persons have over and above those of the (human) animals that constitute them.
    • Do statues have any causal powers over and above the matter that constitutes them. No doubt Baker thinks that they “cause” people to steal them, on account of their relation to an art-world. But are the causative powers really in them, or in the world in which they are embedded? It certainly seems to be different from the causative powers of an animal, which does things using its own resources. Tied in with agency / patiency and the philosophy of action generally?
    • Note that "Merricks (Trenton) - Objects and Persons" denies existence to proposed entities without (extra) causal powers; statues being one kind rejected.
  2. The relationship of constitution is ubiquitous. It is not peculiar to human persons and their bodies. It holds between rivers and aggregates of water molecules, between statues and pieces of marble, between genes and groups of DNA molecules, between stop signs and octagonal pieces of metal. If x constitutes y at t, then x and y are spatially coincident at t, but they not identical. If x constitutes y at t, then x and y have different persistence conditions. Identity is a necessary relation; constitution is contingent. (Indeed, I use the notion of constitution to solve problems that others try to solve by notions of contingent identity, temporal identity, relative identity and so on. The idea of constitution has an advantage over these other views in that the idea of constitution does not compromise the classical notion of identity in its strict Leibnizian form.) I provide a definition of ‘x constitutes y at t’ in order to show that the idea of constitution-without-identity does not suffer from obvious incoherence.
    • I suspect that there are lots of different meanings that can be given to constitution, some less objectionable than others.
    • Just what is supposed to be going on? Is this some sort of emergence of properties? Is constitution “matter plus organisation” or “thing plus further organisation”?
    • Rivers are not constituted by their water molecules, but additionally by their sediments, not to mention their banks, beds and locations. Also, as they are vague objects, there may be conventional elements (just where does the Nile start?). I’m not sure how pervasive these issues are.
    • Note (as usual) that the constitution relation between statues and marble can involve pieces or portions – portions have their parts essentially, while pieces don’t. Can statues be said to be constituted by either?
  3. If x constitutes y at t, then x and y share many of their properties: x weighs 100 lbs. at t if and only if y weighs 100 lbs. at t; x is worth $10,000 at t if and only if y is worth $12,000 at t. Each of these properties has its source in either x or y. If a piece of bronze constitutes a statue at t, then what exists at t is a statue-constituted-by-a-piece-of-bronze, whose weight has its source in its being (constituted by) a piece of bronze, and whose value (usually) has its source in its being a statue. This observation leads to the notion of ‘having properties derivatively.’ The piece of bronze has its weight nonderivatively; the statue has its weight derivatively. The statue has its value nonderivatively; the piece of bronze has its weight derivatively. To have a property derivatively is to constitute, or be constituted by, something that has the property independently of its constitution-relations. Only some properties are subject to being had derivatively. All this is spelled out in two definitions. The notion of having a property derivatively explains why if x and y both weigh 100 lbs. at t, and x and y are not identical, it does not follow that there is an object that weighs 200 lbs. where x is at t.
    • There appear to be a couple of textual corruptions in the above paragraph. Most obviously the trailing “where x is at t”. And Baker wants to say that “The statue has its value nonderivatively; the piece of bronze has its value derivatively” (not weight).
    • Does the piece of bronze have its value derivatively in two senses?
      1. Because the piece is made of bronze (if it was made of something slightly different, or if the bottom dropped out of the market for bronze, its value would differ).
      2. In virtue of constituting a statue.
    • But surely, the bronze isn’t worth the value of the statue, derivatively or not? It’s worth its scrap value, considered as a piece of bronze – ie. in the absence of an art-market that values this statue. It’s true (I think) that what is constituted inherits some of its properties from whatever constitutes it, but it’s not clear to me that the converse is true, and hence that the “iff” in Baker’s claim is incorrect. However, maybe Baker has to insist on this claim to avoid the charge that there are really two things present. She wants her constitution relation to be almost identity, but not quite.
    • The whole issue of value is thorny. Value is a relational rather than intrinsic property. The value of a statue can change without any change to the statue itself. But the properties of persons seem to be intrinsic (though they may also be valued). Isn’t the first-person perspective17 intrinsic to the person (and to the animal)?
    • Note, however, that Baker’s definition only claims sharing of “many” properties, not all – so if she wants she can exclude values.
  4. The idea of constitution is decidedly nonreductive. As long as x constitutes y, x has no independent existence. If x continues to exist after the demise of y, then x comes into its own, existing independently. But during the period that x constitutes y, “what the thing really is” – y, constituted by x – is determined by the identity of y. So, what is in front of you when you go to a museum is a statue (constituted, perhaps, by a piece of bronze). What the thing most fundamentally is a statue; but it is constituted by a piece of bronze.
    • What does Baker mean by “nonreductive”? That the constituting thing is not more important than the constituted? It’s as though the constituted thing “takes over” the constituting thing. This is reductive in the wrong direction (maybe). It seems to be the wrong way round. Surely the piece of bronze still exists when it constitutes the statue – and independently of the statue. The statue only exists because people appreciate it as such.
    • It’s not clear to me how good a model artefacts are for Baker’s other candidates – particularly persons.
    • Can we really take seriously the idea that as an animal (in the normal course of maturation) develops a first-person perspective18, it cease to be primarily an animal and becomes primarily a person?
    • There seem to be two levels of constitution in the case of the bronze. It is constituted mereologically and structurally by an ordered collection of atoms – a different collection at different times. This is what is normally meant by “constitution”. Then there’s Baker’s sense, where the piece of bronze constitutes a statue (she says), but all of a piece. The only real difference between the statue and the bronze piece is evaluative. That is, if the piece (qua piece) can have any shape you like. In Gibbard’s TE, we’re allowed to mould Lump1 into a ball, and it still exists, though Goliath doesn’t. See "Gibbard (Allan) - Contingent Identity".
    • How does constitution work if we don’t know what the thing is. Is Baker a universalist (or whatever the term is) with respect to things? Ie. does the contents of any disconnected agglomeration of spacetime segments constitute a thing?


This text below is my detailed review of "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - The Very Idea of Constitution", Chapter 2 of "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View". The main text is my interpretation of what Baker says, with my specific comments and objections appearing as footnotes.

0. Introduction
  1. Baker will give a very general and technical account of Constitution19 which doesn’t just apply to Persons and their Bodies. The usual examples.
  2. There are three reasons to be explicit about the concept of constitution.
    1. Constitution is not Identity.
      • See:-
        → "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Why Constitution is Not Identity".
      • If so what? A unity relation intermediate between identity and separate existence. Open to caricature and accusations of incoherence, so needs careful exposition.
      • Footnote on the Trinity warning Christians against assuming incoherence.
    2. Constitution – for Baker – is non-standard:
    3. Constitution is a genuine unity-relation (according to Baker):
  3. So, according to Baker’s account, Constitution is not identity in the strict Leibnizian sense22, but is similar to it.
  4. Similar, because the coincident objects23 share a lot of their properties,
  5. But not Identity because if the coincident objects are of different kinds24 they have different persistence conditions. Baker will focus on this distinctness, but – for instance – the statue and the clay are not separate independently existing individuals. So, Baker will argue that Constitution is a third category intermediate between identity and separate existence.
  6. Baker supports all the above with a few footnotes:-
    1. This is a general account, and it is possible to differ on its applications. We can agree that a lump of metal is distinct from the artifact it constitute while denying that a Person is distinct from her body.
    2. Baker takes identity to be strict and necessary, and not Relative25, Contingent26 or any other form of ‘faux identity’. She refers to "Yablo (Stephen) - Identity, Essence, and Indiscernibility", where Stephen Yablo uses the term ‘contingent identity’ to refer to things that are ‘distinct by nature but the same in the circumstances’ saying that is misleading26 to use ‘contingent identity’ to refer to a relation that is not identity.
    3. Baker admits that rather than introduce Constitution to explain why the statue differs from its piece of marble we can invoke 4D28,29. Then, only the Statue-stage is strictly identical to its Marble-stage, but the full space-time worms are not identical. She doesn’t attempt to discuss the matter here. We’re referred to
      → "Lewis (David) - Survival and Identity" (postscript), and – for a critique of temporal parts – to
      → "Thomson (Judith Jarvis) - Parthood and Identity Across Time".

1. A Description of Constitution
  3. Parts of this Section first appeared in "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Unity without Identity: A New Look at Material Constitution".
  4. … to be supplied.

2. The Road to Essentialism
  3. … to be supplied.

3. A Definition of ‘Constitution’
  2. Baker provides a definition of Constitution. This is so technical, that it might as well be quoted verbatim29 so I can then comment on it.
  3. Firstly,
    • Let being an F be x's primary-kind property, and let being a G be y's primary kind property, where being an F ≠ being a G, and let D be G-favorable circumstances.
    • Let F* be the property of having the property of being an F as one's primary-kind property, and let G* be the property of having the property of being a G as one's primary-kind property.
  4. Then:-
    (C) x constitutes y at t =df
    1. x and y are spatially coincident at t; and
    2. x is in D at t; and
    3. It is necessary that: ∀z[(F*zt & z is in D at t) → ∃u(G*ut & u is spatially coincident with z at t)]; and
    4. It is possible that: (x exists at t & ~∃w[G*wt & w is spatially coincident with x at t]); and
    5. If y is immaterial, then x is also immaterial.
  7. Parts of this Section first appeared in "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Unity without Identity: A New Look at Material Constitution".
  8. … to be supplied.

4. Having Properties Derivatively
  2. Baker defines the notion of having properties derivatively. This is so technical, that it might as well be quoted verbatim30
  3. Firstly,
    In order to define the notion of having properties derivatively, I need to define a notion that I shall use in the definition of 'having a property derivatively': the notion of having a property independently of constitution relations. Let H range over properties that are neither alethic properties, nor are identity/constitution/existence properties, nor are properties such that they are rooted outside times at which they are had, nor are hybrid properties.
  4. Then:-
    (I) x has H at t independently of x's constitution relations to y at t =df
    1. x has H at t, and
    2. Either
        1. x constitutes y at t, and
        2. x's having H at t (in the given background) does not entail that x constitutes anything at t.
      Or
        1. y constitutes x at t, and
        2. x's having H at t (in the given background) does not entail that x is constituted by something that could have had H at t without constituting anything at t.
  5. And:-
    (D) x has H at t derivatively =df There is some y such that:
    1. it is not the case that: x has H at t independently of x's constitution relations to y at t; &
    2. y has H at t independently of y's constitution relations to x at t.
  7. … to be supplied.

5. Conclusion
  1. The bulk of this section – the longer first of two paragraphs – is so compressed and useful that it’s worth quoting in full. The bullets are mine:-
    • Constitution is a relation of genuine unity that stops short of identity.
    • During the period that x constitutes y, there are not two separate things.
    • If x constitutes y at any time, then y is a unity that encompasses x during the time that x constitutes y.
    • Constitution is as close to identity as a relation can get without being identity.
    • Constitution is close enough to identity so that if x constitutes y at t, then certain properties – those that are neither alethic, nor constitution/identity/existence, nor rooted outside the times at which they are had, nor hybrid properties that x would have had if x had not constituted y – are — solely on account of the fact that x constitutes y at t — properties of y at t derivatively.
    • And vice versa.
    • And the fact that y has such properties at t is not a different fact from the fact that x has them at t and x constitutes y at t.
    • For any property that y has at t derivatively, the fact that y has it at t derivatively just is the fact that at t, y is constitutionally related to some x that has the property at t independently of being constitutionally related to y.
  2. Baker’s idea of constitution is quite general, but will be applied to Persons and their Bodies in the Chapter 4 ("Baker (Lynne Rudder) - The Constitution View of Human Persons").
  3. It depends only on ‘familiar logical notions’ and the notions of primary-kind properties and ‘circumstances31’. While the latter two notions leave a degree of vagueness, she hopes the idea is sufficiently clear for further application.


In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1:
  • This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (28/09/2022 10:24:58).
  • Link to Latest Write-Up Note.
Footnote 2: Footnote 15: Footnote 20:
  • Is this Essentialist universally agreed?
  • After all, if it was would there still be a Sorites paradox? Maybe; we could still argue whether the heap remained a heap even if we agreed that the removal of a grain means it is no longer the same heap. Not a useful stance though. The Sorites ought to apply to “same heap” as well as to “heap”.
Footnote 26:
  • I agree with Baker’s rejection of deviant so-called identities.
  • It’s not clear what Stephen Yablo means here without reading his paper. From the Introduction, he seems to be saying that you can’t have Essentialism without Contingent Identity. If so, so much the worse for Essentialism, in my view.
Footnotes 29, 30: Footnote 31:
  • I don’t know what this means at the moment.

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